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Abstract
This paper investigates the predictive power of stock market returns in January for
the subsequent eleven months' returns across 19 countries, thereby contributing to the
literature on stock market seasonalities. Only two out of 19 countries' stock markets
exhibit a robust Other January Eect. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the
Other January Eect is not an international phenomenon.
JEL Classication: G10, G11, G12, G14
Keywords: Stock market eciency, Other January Eect, Stock market anomalies"October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to speculate in stocks. The oth-
ers are July, January, September, April, November, May, March, June, December, August,
and February." (Mark Twain (1894))
1 Introduction
Since the late 1970s, a large body of research in nance has questioned the ecient markets
hypothesis. Recently, Cooper et al. (2006) report signicant predictive power of January
stock market returns in the U.S. for returns in the remainder of the calendar year and thus
conrm the market wisdom 'As goes January, so goes the year'. We investigate the presence
of the Other January Eect in 19 countries, thereby broadening empirical evidence to stock
markets with dissimilar institutional and regulatory characteristics. By reducing the data-
snooping bias, we ascertain whether the Other January Eect is a real phenomenon. While
the results for the U.S. are conrmed, we do not nd empirical evidence supporting the
Other January Eect for most of the other 18 countries in our sample.
The Other January Eect was rst discovered for the U.S. by Yale Hirsch in 1972 (Hirsch
and Hirsch (2007)) and termed the January Barometer. Hirsch and Hirsch (2007) report a
91.1% accuracy ratio for this barometer for S&P 500 data since 1950, with extreme events
such as wars being responsible for the exceptions to the rule. They identify major political
events as the fundamental force driving the January Barometer. These are the conventions
of the new Congresses, the President's State of the Union message, the presentation of
the annual budget of the government, and the setting of national goals and priorities by
the President. In the U.S., these political events occur in January, and Hirsch and Hirsch
(2007) hypothesise that moving such incidents to other months could eliminate the January
Barometer. However, as they address mainly practitioners, they do not conduct a rigorous
econometric investigation of the phenomenon.
Bloch and Pupp (1983) test for the January Barometer with S&P 500 data from 1950 to
1982. Once controlled for long-term overall upward trends in the stock market, the January
Barometer does not have statistically signicant forecasting power. Consistently, Fuller
(1978) reports that a trading strategy based on the January Barometer is as protable as
a naive buy-and-hold strategy. By contrast, Hensel and Ziemba (1995a) propose a trading
rule for the U.S. market that recommends buying after a positive January return, whereas
1no conclusive investment advice can be derived from a negative return in January. Hensel
and Ziemba (1995b) investigate the January Barometer's forecasting power internationally.
They conrm their earlier results for the U.S. and nd predictive power of the January
Barometer when January returns are positive for Australia, Canada, Japan, and the U.K.
Hensel and Ziemba (1995b) attribute the January Barometer to economic activity such as
Christmas sales. Using data from the New York Stock Exchange, Brown and Juo (2006) nd
that negative January returns are a reliable predictor for the rest of the year, while positive
January returns' predictive power is much weaker.
Cooper et al. (2006) provide the rst thorough econometric investigation of the Other
January Eect. They examine value-weighted and equally-weighted CRSP market returns
from 1940 to 2003 and stock market return time series for the NYSE index from 1825 to
2003. In their analysis, macroeconomic and business cycle variables, the Presidential cycle,
and investor sentiment indices are accounted for as control variables. The stock market
returns in January reliably predict the return for the rest of the year, while the stock market
returns in the other eleven months cannot predict future returns.
Seemingly signicant calendar eects in stock markets can be the result of extensive
search for abnormal patterns in non-experimental and limited datasets (Sullivan et al.
(2001)). Apparent deviations from unpredictable stock returns are deemed surprising and
hence journals publish disproportionately more papers reporting irregularities. In particu-
lar, the Other January Eect might be the result of snooping the U.S. stock market data
for such an anomaly. Moreover, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Sullivan et al. (2001) argue
that statistical inference based on the empirical properties of a particular sample is prone to
data-snooping biases and hence potentially misleading. Instead of waiting decades until rein-
vestigating the Other January Eect with new data for the U.S. as indicated by Cooper et al.
(2006), we, alternatively, make a contribution by using existent data from other countries as
Schwert (2003) suggests.
Following this approach, we analyse 18 additional stock markets whose return-generating
processes are largely independent of each other, thereby reducing any data-snooping bias.
Moreover, we construct a set of control variables to capture calendar anomalies as well
as varying risk premia due to business cycle uctuations. Specically, we raise the research
question of whether the Other January Eect is an international phenomenon or a peculiarity
of the U.S. stock market.
2The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the methodology in section 2 and the
dataset in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results before section 5 summarises
our ndings and concludes.
2 Methodology
To test the statistical signicance of the Other January Eect, we follow the methodology
proposed by Cooper et al. (2006). We compare monthly stock market returns over eleven
months following positive Januarys with monthly stock market returns in the eleven months
following negative Januarys by estimating
rt =  + OJEt + Xt + Zt 1 + ut ; (1)
where rt is the excess stock market return,  the constant, OJEt the dummy variable to
identify the Other January Eect, Xt and Zt 1 vectors of control variables, and ut the error
term.
The indicator variable OJEt takes the value of 1 for February to December following
Januarys with positive excess stock returns and 0 otherwise. If the estimated coecient of
the dummy variable is statistically signicantly dierent from 0 and positive, the 11-month
holding-period return following a positive January return is signicantly higher than the 11-
month return following a negative January return. This implies that January stock returns
have predictive power for the returns in the following eleven months.
Januarys' predictive power might be associated with other variables and phenomena
which potentially explain stock returns. Therefore, we take contemporaneous and lagged
control variables in the vectors Xt and Zt 1 into account.1 The contemporaneous vector
Xt contains a dummy variable capturing the Halloween Eect put forward by Bouman
and Jacobsen (2002). International evidence indicates that returns for May to October are
substantially lower than for the rest of the calendar year. Therefore, the Halloween indicator
variable HallDt takes the value 1 for each month from November to April and 0 for the
remaining months.
The lagged vector Zt 1 comprises ex ante observable variables related to the business cycle
and international stock market dependencies. Four lagged macroeconomic control variables
1The impact of outliers is also considered. In particular we control for the large monthly declines of stock
markets in October 1987 and in September 2001. Including an outlier dummy variable does not qualitatively
aect the empirical results.
3related to the business cycle are included in Zt 1. The variables are possible proxies for time
varying risk premia on stocks. These variables are:
1. lagged dividend yield DIVt 1;
2. lagged term spread TERMt 1, measured as the dierence between a long-term gov-
ernment bond yield and the short-term interest rate;
3. lagged relative interest rate RRELt 1, which is calculated as the deviation of the
short-term interest rate from its one-year moving
4. expected ination INF e
t 1 formed in t   1 for period t, which is proxied by actual
ination in period t.2
There is broad evidence that those control variables can forecast stock returns (Fama and
French (1988, 1986), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Chen et al. (1986), Keim and Stambaugh
(1986) and Jensen et al. (1996)). Finally, for all markets except the U.S., lagged U.S. stock
market returns rUS
t 1 are included to capture the linkages between the U.S. stock market and
the markets in other countries.3
We start by estimating an unrestricted model which consists of the indicator variable
OJEt and the full set of controls. Applying the general-to-specic methodology we reduce
the complexity of the unrestricted model and provide a robustness check for our empirical
results. Specically, we start with all candidate variables and stepwise eliminate control
variables with coecients that are not statistically signicant at the 10% level. This leads
to a specic model with only statistically signicant coecient estimates for the control
variables. Campbell and Yogo (2006) argue that statistical inference in predictive regressions
using persistent explanatory variables, like the dividend yield, is potentially invalid. As a
robustness check, we estimate regressions without the vectors of control variables.4
The regression equations are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The standard
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity in the residuals using the method proposed by
2The lagged default spread, which is dened as the dierence between the return on a portfolio of corporate
bonds and on long-term government bonds, was also considered as a macroeconomic control variable. Since
returns on corporate bonds are available for much shorter sample periods for most countries this variable
was omitted from our baseline regression in order to increase the sample length. The empirical ndings
additionally using the lagged default spread in the shorter sample periods do not aect our main conclusion.
3To control for joint eects and comovements, contemporaneous U.S. stock market returns rUS
t are added
to the set of control variables. The variable appears to be statistical signicant for many countries but the
empirical ndings on the Other January Eect are unaected.
4In addition, we also run the general-to-specic procedure starting with all candidate variables without
lagged dividend yield. The empirical results conrm the robustness of the main results.
4White (1980).5 In order to strengthen statistical inference and to control for data-snooping
biases, we use standard errors which are obtained from the randomized-bootstrap procedure
with 10,000 replications suggested by Cooper et al. (2006). This bootstrap procedure explic-
itly controls for the predictive power of stock returns in the remaining eleven month. The
characteristics of the randomized-bootstrap procedure are described in detail in the paper
by Cooper et al. (2006).
3 Data
Our dataset comprises monthly observations on stock market indices and macroeconomic
variables for 19 major industrialized countries with mature stock markets: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.
The selection of these countries is motivated by data availability. To obtain a sucient long
common sample period for the empirical investigation, only countries are considered where
data is available at least from 1970. All stock market and macroeconomic time series are
denominated in local currency units. Sample periods vary across variables and countries.
For each country we select the longest common sample for the whole set of stock market and
macroeconomic variables.
Stock market returns for each country are calculated using value-weighted total return
indices. Fama (1998) argues that value-weighted returns, rather than equal-weighted returns,
are the appropriate data to test for an anomaly as they replicate investment performance.
The excess stock return in % per month is calculated as
rt =







 100 ; (2)
where It is the value of the performance index and is
t is the short-term interest rate in %
per annum. We use simple compounded dividend yields DYt and compute continuously
compounded dividend yields DIVt = ln(1 + DYt)  100. Depending on country specic
availability, we use the Treasury bill rate, the central bank discount rate, commercial paper
yields or, alternatively, the money market rate, as the short-term interest rate. The long-
term government bond rate is the 10-year government bond yield. The ination rate is
5In addition, we correct standard errors for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals using
the method proposed by Newey and West (1987) with a maximum lag length of 6. The empirical results are
robust concerning the number of lags.
5proxied by the change in consumer prices. All time series are taken from Global Financial
Data.
4 Empirical Results
Table 1 summarises the estimation results for the model without control variables and the
model with a reduced number of control variables. We report ndings for the country-specic
full sample period and in addition for the shorter sample 1970-2007 common for all countries
to obtain comparable cross country results. Besides the empirical results regarding the
Other January Eect, Table 1 also reports the estimated coecients of the control variables
with their p-values. In general, statistically signicant point estimates have the theoretically
expected signs. Coecients of the Halloween dummy are signicant for most of the countries.
Among the other control variables, relative interest rate and expected ination are the most
inuential ones. Moreover, national excess returns are, in general, positively correlated with
the U.S. stock market. Across most countries and model specications, the empirical results
are largely robust to statistical inference with standard p-values or bootstrapped ones.6
Insert Table 1 about here
More important, for the U.S., monthly excess stock market returns are, on average, higher
by 0.73% over the full sample (1.01% over the short sample) following positive Januarys
than after Januarys scoring negative returns. This result is statistically signicant at the
1% level (5% level) and consistent with Cooper et al. (2006). While the Other January
Eect is signicant and remarkably large for the U.S., it vanishes as the sample is extended
internationally. In particular, the countries with stock markets that are not subject to the
Other January Eect are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, South Korea, and Sweden. By contrast, Finland,
Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the U.K. exhibit the Other January Eect. For Finland and
Switzerland the Other January Eect is insignicant when estimated without using control
variables. The Other January Eect in Spain is not present in the model with control
variables. In the U.K., the Other January Eect is more prominent in the recent sample
compared to the 1924-2007 period.
6Empirical results on the randomized-bootstrap inference are not reported but are available on request.
6Additionally, as a robustness check, we investigate the predictive power of stock returns
in each of the remaining calendar months from February to December.7 It turns out that
some other calender months in a few countries have statistically signicant predictive power
for the following eleven months with magnitudes comparable to the results we report for
the Other January Eect. Nevertheless, a consistent and robust pattern across months or
countries cannot be identied.
The empirical evidence reported by Cooper et al. (2006) on the Other January Eect is
sensitive to the selection of the sample period. While the anomaly is signicant for the full
sample (1973-2003), it disappears in non-overlapping 10-year subperiods from 1980 onwards.
Therefore, as a further robustness check, we investigate the predictive power of each month
by country over subperiods.8 The results of Cooper et al. (2006) are conrmed for our data
set, too. As for the U.S. the Other January Eect disappears for Finland, Spain and the U.K.
in the seventies. Only for Norway and Switzerland, the Other January Eect is statistical
signicant over time. Moreover, there are very few countries in which a particular month
has predictive power throughout all subperiods. For most countries the predictive power of
particular months varies over time.
In summary, the Other January Eect is an American peculiarity and cannot be detected
for most of the remaining 18 stock markets in our dataset. In fact, large and highly developed
stock markets other than the U.S., such as Japan, France and Germany do not exhibit the
Other January Eect. These results give rise to the hypothesis that the Other January Eect
is not a widely observed phenomenon.
5 Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to investigate the presence of the Other January Eect in 19
countries. This stock market anomaly stems from the market wisdom 'As January goes, as
goes the year' and refers to the observation that U.S. stock market returns in January can
serve as a reliable predictor for the market return in the subsequent eleven months. We
provide international empirical evidence on the Other January Eect, as existing literature
on this anomaly focuses on the U.S. stock market. By including stock markets other than
7Since January returns are included into those regressions we additionally control for the well-known
January Eect. Detailed empirical results are available on request.
8Detailed empirical results are available on request.
7the U.S. in our sample, data-snooping biases are reduced.
For the U.S., we nd evidence in favour of the Other January Eect, which is consistent
with the results in Cooper et al. (2006). Among the 18 other countries in our sample,
only for Norway and Switzerland the stock market anomaly is statistical signicant over
various subperiods. Hence, there is no broad and robust empirical evidence in favour of
an international Other January Eect. Regarding the forecasting power of the remaining
months, we nd that January is not unique in its capability to predict stock market returns.
In fact, almost every month shows statistically signicant forecasting power in at least one
of the 19 countries under investigation without a consistent pattern.
In essence, only two out of 19 countries exhibit a robust Other January Eect. The
existence of statistically signicant forecasting power of particular months seems to be de-
termined by the selection of stock markets or sample periods. Systematically predicting
stock returns based on previous return observations appears to be impossible. In light of
this evidence, we conclude that the Other January Eect is not an international phenomenon.
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10Table 1: The Other January Eect
Country Sample period Regression coecients (p-values)
rt =  + OJEt + ut rt =  + OJEt + Xt + Zt 1 + ut
Constant OJEt Constant OJEt HallDt DIVt 1 TERMt 1 RRELt 1 INFe
t 1 rUS
t 1
Australia 1903:1 - 2007:12 0:34 0:22 0:50 0:27 - - - -  0:07 0:10
(0:230) (0:492) (0:102) (0:375) (0:008) (0:000)
1970:1 - 2007:12 0:35  0:24 0:22  0:24 - - - - - 0:18
(0:347) (0:653) (0:564) (0:642) (0:005)
Austria 1970:1 - 2007:12 0:186 0:05  0:84 0:17 1:714 - - - - 0:22
(0:556) (0:923) (0:043) (0:717) (0:000) (0:000)
Belgium 1951:1 - 2007:12 0:25  0:11  0:74 0:04 1:00 0:25 - -  0:19 0:17
(0:600) (0:832) (0:290) (0:935) (0:002) (0:074) (0:004) (0:000)
1970:1 - 2007:12 0:09 0:17  0:18 0:42 1:54 - - -  0:17 0:14
(0:875) (0:778) (0:781) (0:472) (0:000) (0:018) (0:008)
Canada 1936:1 - 2007:12 0:19 0:12  0:17  :02 0:67 - -  0:27 - 0:20
(0:530) (0:733) (0:622) (0:947) (0:023) (0:073) (0:000)
1970:1 - 2007:12 0:25  0:20  0:18  0:31 0:89 - -  0:31 - 0:10
(0:464) (0:663) (0:669) (0:510) (0:047) (0:081) (0:037)
Denmark 1970:1 - 2007:12 0:04 0:02 0:19  0:23 - 0:36 -  0:34  0:20 -
(0:939) (0:976) (0:763) (0:697) (0:055) (0:031) (0:030)
Finland 1963:1 - 2007:12  0:70 1:33  0:87 1:84 1:62 - - -  0:17 -
(0:438) (0:158) (0:357) (0:055) (0:003) (0:001)
1970:1 - 2007:12  0:77 1:43  0:97 2:12 1:66 - - -  0:20 -
(0:522) (0:246) (0:428) (0:093) (0:008) (0:000)
France 1896:1 - 2007:12 0:43  0:15  0:41  :05 0:90 - 0:26 - - 0:10
(0:140) (0:654) (0:259) (0:884) (0:032) (0:031) (0:001)
1970:1 - 2007:12 0:49  0:51  4:03 0:23 1:82 1:67 - -  0:71 0:15
(0:421) (0:452) (0:000) (0:726) (0:001) (0:000) (0:000) (0:022)
Germany 1870:1 - 2007:12  0:36 0:39  1:40 0:49 0:83 - 0:37 - - 0:08
(ex 1922-1924) (0:249) (0:402) (0:004) (0:305) (0:040) (0:007) (0:008)
1970:1 - 2007:12 0:08 0:12  0:52 0:04 1:15 - -  0:53 - 0:16
(0:887) (0:842) (0:364) (0:940) (0:021) (0:027) (0:017)
Italy 1926:1 - 2007:12 0:74  0:85 0:68  :93 - - -  0:42 - 0:14
(0:141) (0:135) (0:179) (0:103) (0:074) (0:001)
1970:1 - 2007:12  1:13 1:05  1:83 0:87 1:53 - - - - 0:19
(0:081) (0:158) (0:013) (0:241) (0:015) (0:008)
Japan 1931:1 - 2007:12 0:06 0:72  1:14 0:57 1:14 0:22 - - - -
(0:888) (0:128) (0:030) (0:226) (0:005) (0:004)
1970:1 - 2007:12  0:13 0:54  1:68 0:73 1:36 1:14 - -  0:19 -
(0:799) (0:343) (0:035) (0:204) (0:008) (0:013) (0:005)
Netherlands 1952:1 - 2007:12 0:31 0:16 0:11 0:44 1:44 - -  0:55  0:21 0:13
(0:499) (0:751) (0:846) (0:380) (0:000) (0:001) (0:002) (0:021)
1970:1 - 2007:12 0:01 0:47  0:35 1:00 1:72 - -  0:58  0:25 0:13
(0:992) (0:456) (0:609) (0:117) (0:000) (0:001) (0:003) (0:069)
1
1Table 1 (continued): The Other January Eect
Country Sample period Regression coecients (p-values)
rt =  + OJEt + ut rt =  + OJEt + Xt + Zt 1 + ut
Constant OJEt Constant OJEt HallDt DIVt 1 TERMt 1 RRELt 1 INFe
t 1 rUS
t 1
Norway 1970:1 - 2007:12  0:87 1:25  2:87 2:12 - 1:25 - -  0:43 0:16
(0:153) (0:088) (0:013) (0:004) (0:001) (0:000) (0:097)
South Africa 1961:1 - 2007:12 0:58  0:04  1:76  :07 1:16 0:51 -  0:39 - -
(0:203) (0:946) (0:079) (0:909) (0:034) (0:030) (0:057)
1970:1 - 2007:12 0:57  0:14  1:70  0:27 1:14 0:50 -  0:40 - -
(0:222) (0:826) (0:101) (0:693) (0:074) (0:044) (0:063)
South Korea 1964:1 - 2007:12 0:23 0:48 0:31  :18 - 0:24 -  0:51  0:17 -
(0:731) (0:559) (0:618) (0:822) (0:006) (0:001) (0:064)
1970:1 - 2007:12 0:16 0:54 0:05 0:01 - 0:19 -  0:71  0:12 -
(0:732) (0:456) (0:937) (0:992) (0:042) (0:001) (0:088)
Spain 1952:1 - 2007:12  0:46 1:10  0:20 0:70 0:98 - 0:24 -  0:13 0:15
(0:264) (0:020) (0:747) (0:143) (0:013) (0:088) (0:001) (0:007)
1970:1 - 2007:12  0:64 1:16  0:51 0:63 1:35 - 0:32 -  0:15 0:18
(0:203) (0:054) (0:9538) (0:314) (0:012) (0:075) (0:012) (0:005)
Sweden 1919:1 - 2007:12  0:15 0:51  0:46 0:45 0:66 - -  0:35 - 0:06
(0:723) (0:267) (0:306) (0:322) (0:040) (0:012) (0:094)
1970:1 - 2007:12 0:19 0:25  1:95  0:01 1:88 0:82 -  0:47  0:22 0:18
(0:822) (0:780) (0:116) (0:995) (0:002) (0:020) (0:004) (0:070) (0:035)
Switzerland 1970:1 - 2007:12  0:18 0:69  0:08 0:85 0:84 - -  0:29  0:24 0:15
(0:666) (0:163) (0:891) (0:075) (0:052) (0:099) (0:020) (0:018)
U.K. 1924:1 - 2007:12  0:15 0:63  0:56 0:52 0:82 - - - - 0:14
(0:649) (0:095) (0:121) (0:161) (0:006) (0:001)
1970:1 - 2007:12  0:87 1:49  3:76 1:60 1:56 0:75 - -  0:17 -
(0:090) (0:013) (0:015) (0:007) (0:002) (0:091) (0:049)
U.S. 1872:1 - 2007:12  0:18 0:70  0:29 0:73 - - 0:19 - - -
(0:450) (0:012) (0:210) (0:009) (0:004)
1970:1 - 2007:12  0:38 1:10  1:41 1:01 0:77 0:62 -  0:35  0:26 -
(0:313) (0:016) (0:054) (0:027) (0:061) (0:011) (0:090) (0:024)
Notes: The values in parentheses are p-values using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors proposed by White (1980). ; ; denote statistical signicance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
1
2